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INTRODUCTION
The labour movement has always
had a difficult relationship with the
state. Governments of the centre and
right have normally sought to limit
union growth, contain union wage
demands and marginalise the
economic and political economic
influence of the labour movement.
However, labour’s relationship with
social democratic governments has
presented equally challenging
issues. Given that Labour usually
feels it has a stake in keeping social
democratic governments in office, it
has to evaluate what it can
reasonably expect such governments
to implement and shape its demands
accordingly.
Historically, unions have pressed
for improvements in labour
legislation to make it easier to
organise. They have also lobbied for
changes to broader government
policy, such as higher employment
standards, fair wage requirements,
ending privatisation and
encouraging governments to use, or
purchase from, unionised
contractors and suppliers.
In the construction industry, the
building trades unions have
historically focused on certifying the
major contractors employing their
members on a trades-by-trades
basis. However, this practice has
become increasingly difficult in
recent years, as anti-union
employers, often with government
assistance, have systematically
expanded their share of the
industry.
British Columbia’s building
trades unions,  that once had among
the highest union densities in the
country, were devastated by the
overtly anti-union legislation and
policies of the Social Credit
Governments during the 1983 to
1991 period. Union density dropped
dramatically and the certification
success rate fell even more
precipitously.2  Membership declines
in the trades were notable during
periods of high unemployment.
Many union members confronted
the choice of non-union work or no
work at all.
The election of the New
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Democratic Party (NPD), a social
democratic Government,  in 1991
provided an opportunity for BC’s
building trades to regain lost
ground. The new provincial
Government revised the Labour
Code, eliminating some of the worst
changes enacted by the previous
Social Credit administration.
However most changes were not
focused on the building trades,
specifically, and hence provided
only partial relief from the
continuing pressures of the non-
union contractors who were now
dominant in the sector.
The building trades felt that the
Government could do much more in
the one area where it exercised
direct control: publicly funded
construction projects. They wanted
Government contracts to be
awarded to union contractors. In
response, the NDP Government took
some steps to assist the building
trades, such as establishing fair
wage requirements through the
Skills Development and Fair Wage
Act, a policy change the building
trades had long advocated.
However, the NDP was unwilling to
face the onslaught from business
sector and the corporate controlled
media that would accompany a
policy of awarding highway
contracts exclusively to unionised
construction firms.3
Instead, it adopted a different
approach, based on BC’s long
history of Project Agreements in the
hydro electricity sector. This offered
a way of addressing some of the
concerns of the unions, while
simultaneously enabling the
Government to implement some of
its key public policy objectives.
THE ‘PROJECT AGREEMENT’
MODEL
Adoption of a ‘Project Agreement’
model in other sectors of
Government construction –
specifically highways and
transportation infrastructure – was
not an obvious one. It was largely
conceptualised by the (then)
Minister of Finance (and,
subsequently, Premier) Glen Clark
who had cut his teeth in the labour
movement as a building trades
organiser. Clark fought successfully
to have this approach accepted by
his Cabinet colleagues. And Clark
put together the team of negotiators
who subsequently translated the
Government’s mandate into a viable
collective agreement.
A Project Agreement is a
collective agreement covering an
entire capital project. All the major
building trades unions are brought
together under a single council
which negotiates a common
agreement with either a single
employer or a council of employers.
The agreement applies for the
duration of the project and contains
provisions for renegotiations of
certain issues such as wage re-
openers. It substantially reduces the
risks – and costs – of disputes for
Government, while providing a
vehicle for resolving employee
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grievances and other labour
relations issues. In return for the
benefits of a collective agreement
and blanket unionisation of the
project, the unions accept a no-
strike, no lockout provision.
On the union side, the Project
Agreement approach was generally
supported by the highway
construction unions, many of whom
had had direct experience of the
model from their lengthy
involvement with BC Hydro
construction. (It should be noted
that hydro construction is a different
– and distinct - section of the
construction industry with
overlapping, but not identical,
unions.)
The ‘Project Agreement’ model
was initially limited to one major
project: the $1.2 billion Vancouver
Island highway (VIHP). However, it
was the largest capital project in
Western Canada at the time.
Vancouver Island was a major
labour stronghold in BC. The Island
forest industry was almost entirely
unionised and the region had a long
and proud tradition of union
activity. However, non-union
contractors were pushing to make
highway construction ‘union free’.
Given the size of this project, a major
confrontation between the building
trades and the non-union
contractors – a confrontation
foreshadowed by bitter conflicts
over the use of non-union labour in
mill construction in Port Alberni.
The adoption of a ‘Project
Agreement’ model offered a way to
avoid this conflict.
In agreeing to negotiate a ‘Project
Agreement’ with the Government,
the building trades believed that the
opportunities offered by such an
agreement were worth the price of
allowing the Government to achieve
its policy objectives (discussed
below).
For the Government, a Project
Agreement provided a vehicle for
implementing the 1993 Build BC
Act. Its purpose was to use capital
spending to expand and diversify
the British Columbia economy. Its
goals included job creation, regional
development, training, and
providing opportunities for
“traditionally disadvantaged
individuals and groups.” The
Government felt that capital
spending could generate major
economic and social spin-offs, but
only if there was a conscious and
systematic effort to incorporate these
objectives into the planning and
implementation process.
The Act established a new Crown
Corporation, the BC Transportation
Financing Authority (BCTFA), with
a specific mandate to apply these
public policy objectives to major
capital investments in transportation
infrastructure across the province.
The Build BC Act, was influenced by
BC’s problematic history of major
capital projects. Historically, much
of BC’s economic growth was driven
by resource, energy and
transportation infrastructure mega-
projects. These projects sometimes
impacted significantly on the rural
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and remote communities affected,
often displacing other, locally based
economic activities. Too often they
failed to provide employment,
economic development, training or
related benefits for the communities
affected. Jobs often went to outsiders
while local businesses were
relegated to a minor role as
suppliers or service sub-contractors.
First Nations had been particularly –
and negatively - affected. Entire
communities were relocated to make
way for the construction of
hydroelectric dams, transmission
lines, pipelines and new highways.
Little, or no training was provided
to First Nations workers. Outside
contractors actively discriminated
against hiring them in favour of
workers recruited from elsewhere.
However, by the early 1990s, First
Nations’ treaty negotiations began to
create new uncertainties for capital
projects in BC. The proposed VIHP
traversed the traditional territory of
a number of First Nations. In other
parts of the Province, First Nations
had expressed their opposition to
infrastructure projects through
blockades. The Government wanted
to avoid such incidents on the new
highway. Moreover, the NDP had
made commitments to promote
employment equity in training and
hiring. It was committed to
incorporating this objective into
major capital projects.4
Most of the highway construction
unions were also signatories to the
Project Agreement with BC Hydro
and, therefore, were aware of the
way in which such Agreements
supported unionisation. A Project
Agreement for highway
construction would ensure that the
entire Project was unionised. And it
would provide the opportunity to
bring a significant number of new
workers into the respective unions.
A Project Agreement also offered the
promise of a stable - and generally
good - labour relations climate and
effective health and safety programs.
HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS
To understand why both the
building trades and the Government
supported the concept of Project
Agreements, a brief history of this
approach is needed. BC Hydro and
the building trades unions had
brought the concept of Project
Agreements, used in the Saint
Lawrence Seaway Project, to BC in
the early 1960s.5  In return for
restrictions on the right to strike and
an end to whipsawing, Seaway
employers had agreed to
‘International Signers Agreements’
that guaranteed union membership
on all phases of the Project.
BC Hydro had wanted labour
peace for the construction of the
massive dams on the Columbia and
Peace Rivers. It did not want the
kind of union/employer conflicts
that had occurred in the 1950s at the
Kemano smelter or at the Burrard
power plant near Vancouver. The
Columbia Treaty with the US
included a completion schedule with
penalties if BC Hydro did not get the
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work done on time. So the BC
Government had a major incentive
to avoid labour disputes.
The easiest way, legally, to craft
an agreement was to make BC
Hydro the employer of record,
rather than certifying each
individual employer. On their side,
the unions formed the Allied Hydro
Council. The Council then
negotiated 10 year Project
Agreements with Peace Power
Constructors (PPC) and Columbia
Hydro Constructors (CHC), both
subsidiaries of BC Hydro.
What was different about the BC
Project Agreements, compared to
other construction agreements, was
that the individual contractors were
not certified with the relevant
building trades unions. Rather, BC
Hydro acted as the employer of the
entire workforce. Contractors were
not employers. Rather, they
purchased their labour from CHC.
All contractors, including those not
certified with the building trades,
had to use workers whose terms and
conditions were established by the
collective agreement. And, all
workers had to be covered by the
agreement.6
In the renegotiations of the CHC
– building trades agreement in 1993,
the NDP Government and the Board
of BC Hydro pushed to include a
number of new provisions which
reflected the Government’s public
policy agenda, including training
and employment equity
commitments. These were to be
critical in the agreement
subsequently negotiated for the
Vancouver Island Highway Project.
ADOPTION OF THE PROJECT
AGREEMENT MODEL ON THE
VIHP
The VIHP was the overall project,
including planning, financing,
engineering, construction and all the
other related activities associated
with a Government highways
program. The VIHP was a new, high
speed, controlled access highway
stretching from Campbell River in
the north to Victoria in the south.
The Province set up a new company,
Highway Constructors Limited
(HCL), on January 13, 1994 to supply
the labour needed by the Project.
HCL was a wholly owned
subsidiary of the BCTFA. Its Board
included the Deputy Ministers of the
key ministries with an interest in its
policy objectives. Its purpose was to
be the employer of the labour force
for the entire Project and to manage
labour relations. By becoming the
employer of record, HCL would
have the capacity to put in the
Government’s policy objectives,
including: employment equity,
training, local hire and support for
locally based contractors.7
On their side, the unions
established the BC Highway and
Related Construction Council to
enable them to negotiate a collective
agreement covering the entire
Project.
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KEY DETAILS OF THE
AGREEMENT
The collective agreement required
union membership on the Project,
subject to the normal exclusions
permitted under BC’s Labour Code.
Within 30 days of starting work for
HCL, employees were required to
join the appropriate building trades
union. Regardless of whether a
contractor was ‘union’ or ‘non-
union’ in its other operations it
would have to accept unionised
workers assigned to it by HCL. This
meant that contractors whose
workers had never been organised
in the past, or who had been
organised by unions outside the
building trades, would be
supervising unionised building
trades workers on their sites. To
allow contractors to bring their core
workers on site, they were permitted
to ‘name request’ up to five of their
customary workers on a ‘one for
one’ basis with HCL assigned
workers. However, workers named
by the contractors would have to
become HCL employees and join the
union.
Once accepted as union members
under the HCL agreement, workers
could choose to remain members
after leaving the project, as long as
they were prepared to pay union
dues. Membership, once granted,
was not tied to working for HCL on
the Island Highway and under most
union constitutions, could be
continued at the members’ option.
To accommodate the equity and
local hire provision of the collective
agreement, the traditional hiring hall
practice, where the union dispatches
members to employers based on
requests for labour, was modified to
enable HCL to dispatch workers to
the various contractors on the
project. Although each union
maintained its hiring hall list, HCL
could give priority in dispatch to
equity group members and, where
the union did not have such
members available, HCL could
dispatch them from its pool of
qualified employees.
Three other major modifications
to the normal industry collective
agreement are worth noting. The
first was a limitation on the
provincial seniority rights of existing
union members. Preference was,
instead, to be given to local residents
living within 100 kilometres of the
worksites. This meant that HCL
could dispatch its trainees, qualified
local residents and members of
equity groups before any union
members from other parts of the
Province were offered jobs. Several
unions affiliated to the Council had
significant numbers of unemployed
members in other parts of the
Province. Consequently, the local
hire provision was a major
accommodation to the BC 21 goals
of the Government.
Second, the agreement gave HCL
the right to ask the unions to
dispatch qualified equity workers,
newly trained equity workers and
equity trainees to the job sites first,
in preference to other workers.
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When combined with the local hire
provisions that effectively excluded
off-island workers unless no equity,
or locally qualified, workers were
available, this provision gave HCL
the ability to implement
employment equity goals.
Third, the agreement permitted
HCL to train large numbers of
workers from equity groups and
local residents on Income Assistance
to work on the highway. The
training program only made sense if
its graduates were given the
opportunity to take jobs on the
highway. The unions assisted in the
development of the training
program, both through sharing their
curriculum materials and by offering
places at the union administered
training schools.8
The unions and HCL recognised
that an accurate system for
collecting data was essential to
document progress in achieving
equity goals. They agreed to collect
extensive data in three main equity
areas: applications for jobs, equity
training and equity employment,
both by numbers of workers and by
hours worked. In addition, data on
local hire was also collected. Later in
the Project, the parties agreed to
monitor youth employment – one of
the priorities of the Clark
Government. Finally, the database
provided for the collection of
detailed information on union
membership, employment and
contractor assignments.
IMPACT OF THE VANCOUVER
ISLAND PROJECT AGREEMENT
The Project Agreement can be
evaluated from a number of
different perspectives. From the
Government’s point of view, the key
issues were: cost; schedule; equity
training and employment; local hire
and community economic impact.
On the cost side, the seven-year
project came in slightly under the
projected cost estimate – an estimate
made in 1993 by the Ministry of
Transportation and Highways
before the HCL approach was
contemplated.9
HCL resulted in a more
competitive bidding process, with
the number of bids per contract at
over 5 compared with other
highway projects that had a 3.7 bid
per contract record. HCL’s
management of payroll and labour
relations meant that it was able to
pass on its economies of scale to the
smaller contractors, enabling them
to submit bids on work which
otherwise would be beyond their
resources and capacity.
With respect to training,
according to HCL’s data, 13% of
hours worked on the Project were
allocated to worker training. This
was in addition to the training
programs HCL provided. Over 330
Islanders were trained to be
labourers, truck drivers or heavy
equipment operators.  According to
HCL data, one-fifth of the workers
were from underrepresented groups
in 1998 (table 1).
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Table 1: Vancouver Island Highway Project - Labour Force Report
(For the period of January 1, 1998 to December 31, 1998)
Classifications Total Men Women First
Nations
Youth People with
Disabilities
Visible
Minorities
Total Under
represented
Bricklayers 5 5 0 0 1 0 0 1
Carpenters 90 88 2 6 18 0 1 27
Cem. Masons 28 28 0 1 2 0 1 4
Electricians 3 3 0 0 1 0 0 1
Ironworkers 57 57 0 2 5 1 0 8
Labourers 252 226 26 16 2 3 2 49
Operators 332 321 11 23 39 5 2 80
Painters 2 2 0 0 1 0 0 1
Piledrivers 5 5 0 1 1 0 0 2
Pipefitters 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Teansters 200 191 9 9 10 0 2 30
Tech/Clerical 9 8 1 0 1 0 1 3
TOTAL 986 937 49 58 81 9 9 206
Total of Equity Individuals 125
Total Underrepresented Groups 206
Total Individuals 986
Total Positions Worked 1981
Percentage Equity Hours worked by Four Equity Groups 18.3%
Percentage Hours Worked by Youth 8.3%
Percentage Total Hours Worked by Underrepresented
Groups
26.6%
Percentage of Four Equity Working 12.7%
Women 5.0%
First Nations 5.9%
People with disabilities 0.9%
Visible Minorities 0.9%
Percentage of Youth Working 8.2%
Total Underrepresented Groups Working 20.9%
Hours Worked by Underrepresented Groups 119,692 (26.6%)
Hours Worked by Other Workers 329,611 (73.4%)
Total Hours Worked 449,303 (100.0%)
Notes:
1. Adding across the rows may not equal the “Total Equity” number because some individuals may
represent more than one group; however, the "Total Equity" column represents the total number of
individuals.
2. The "Total Individual" columns represent those individuals who have self-identified as belonging
to that equity group; they may identify themselves to be represented in more than one group
(column).
3. The "Percentage of Equity Working" measures individuals working in that pay period and does not
double-count equity groupings.
4. All equity statistics represent only those individuals who have completed a "self-identify" survey.
5. Youth are defined as those individuals who were at the time of hire between the age of 15 - 24
years and are not one of the other four equity categories.
Source: Highway Constructors Ltd.
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Marjorie Griffin-Cohen and Kate
Braid carried out a major study of
the equity initiatives on the VIHP.10
They concluded that the project
largely achieved its equity
objectives, commenting that it was
“stunningly successful” despite a
number of teething problems. From
1996 to 2001 the percentage of equity
hours worked ranged from a low of
15.5% (1996) to a high of 22.1%
(1998). By the end of 1999, 463
people had benefited from the
project’s employment equity
program.11
With respect to local economic
impact, 93% of payroll went to local
residents. Many of the trainees –
especially First Nations – gained
valuable job experience that they
have been able to transfer to other
projects on the Island.12  The fact that
HCL managed payroll, training,
recruitment and labour relations
made it much easier for local
contractors to bid successfully on
work and thus secured additional
benefits for the local economy.
THE EXPERIENCE OF THE
PROJECT AGREEMENT FROM A
UNION PERSPECTIVE
From the perspective of the unions,
there were both positive and
negative experiences, but on
balance, representatives of the
building trades have seen the project
as a sound model for future public
construction. The fact that the
largest construction project in
Vancouver Island’s history was built
by unionised workers is the most
obvious and significant outcome.
However, there were others.
HCL, with the co-operation of the
unions, implemented a very
extensive training program. This
provided new employees with an
orientation to the industry and the
opportunity to learn specific skills,
primarily in three occupations:
construction labourers, teamsters
and operating engineers. It also
provided the opportunity to learn
about health and safety issues and
employment rights.
The one major criticism made of
the training by some unions was
that the agreement did not specify
ratios of trainees to qualified
workers. Because contractors were
not clear about the expectations
relating to training, some did not
accommodate as many trainees as
they might have. To be fair,
however, HCL did push hard to
provide opportunities to trainees,
monitoring the number with each
contractor and taking steps to
expand trainee opportunities
wherever possible.
One important accomplishment for
the unions was the development and
implementation of a very successful
health and safety program that all
contractors were required to
follow.13 HCL had an accident
related lost-time rate 38 per cent
better than the province's
construction industry. It won three
health and safety awards in 1996,
four awards in 1997 including a
national Award of Excellence
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presented by Occupational Health
and Safety Magazine and two more
awards in 1998.
During the first two million hours
worked on the project not a single
complaint was filed under BC’s
Employment Standards Act – a
remarkable record in light of the
very large number of complaints
normally received from the
construction industry. According to
Gary Kroeker, President of the BC
Highway and Related Construction
Council, the agreement also
facilitated the expeditious handling
of grievances as well as providing an
effective framework for dealing with
Workers’ Compensation Board and
Employment Insurance Issues
The Project Agreement model also
enabled the unions to protect the
financial interests of their members.
In the construction industry it is not
uncommon for sub-contractors and
contractors to go bankrupt and fail
to pay their employee’s wages. Yet
on the Project, every worker was
paid.
The unions also were given the
opportunity to recruit significant
numbers of new members, many of
whom were members of equity
groups. While, initially, the equity
component of the Agreement was a
Government initiative, the fact that
the unions had agreed to the equity
training and equity hire provisions
meant that they had a commitment
to fulfil these obligations. Over time,
and with the influx of new equity
members, the unions became more
accepting – indeed supportive – of
this aspect of the Project.
Relations between unions and
First Nations in BC varied
depending on the region and union.
While some unions had been
relatively welcoming to First
Nations members, others had done
little to recruit First Nations into
their membership. However, many
First Nations became union
members on the Project and had the
opportunity to continue their union
membership afterwards. The VIHP
and the BCTFA also put in place a
demonstration project with a First
Nations road building company in
which it was able to ‘partner’ with
private contractors for the
construction of a segment of the
highway. Tenders were also
evaluated not only on the basis of
low bid but also according to the
training and employment
opportunities provided to First
Nations.14
One of the major challenges – and
opportunities – provided for the
unions under the agreement was to
persuade the workers employed by
HCL of the value of union
membership. The VIHP was a very
large project. Most unions did not
have the resources on the Island that
were required to carry out extensive
education and membership
orientation..
Moreover, one of the limitations
of the collective agreement is that it
did not require newly hired workers
to visit their respective union offices
before starting employment. Thus
contact was generally limited to the
Calvert and Redlin 11
job sites. The opportunity to meet
new members and explain the
advantages of union membership at
the beginning of employment might
have made further organising much
easier.
The issue of how effective the
unions were in taking advantage of
the opportunities provided by the
agreement is controversial. Some
HCL staff felt that the unions could
have done much more to welcome
members and persuade them of the
benefits of unionisation. In some
cases union educational efforts (as
opposed to training) were minimal
and contacts with members on job
sites perfunctory. The percentage of
workers who have maintained
union membership is relatively
small – one union official guessed
that only 10% kept up their
membership after the project was
completed.
EXTENSION OF THE PROJECT
AGREEMENT MODEL TO OTHER
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT
CAPITAL PROJECTS
The BCTFA carried out a detailed
assessment of the advantages and
disadvantages of the Project
Agreement for the Island Highway.
It concluded that it was a sound –
and cost effective - way to carry out
major highway construction
projects. Accordingly, in 1997, the
BC Cabinet approved the expansion
of this model to all major linear
transportation projects valued at
over $50 million in the Province.
This included: the $1.2 billion
Millennium Line Skytrain
expansion; the repair of Vancouver’s
Lion’s Gate Bridge, the addition of a
fifth (HOV) lane on the Port Mann
Bridge and improvements to the
Cape Horn Interchange, the John
Hart Bridge and Interchange Project
in Prince George; construction of $60
million Trans Canada Highway
HOV lanes in the Lower Mainland;
and an upgrade to the Trans Canada
Highway from Cache Creek to the
Rockies and Nisga'a Highway, a
project specifically negotiated with
one of the northern First Nations.
Late in the NDP’s term, the
model was adopted for other
projects outside the transportation
sector. The most significant of these
was the development of a new
Project Agreement for BC’s coastal
silviculture industry. In April 1998,
The IWA negotiated a collective
agreement with New Forest
Opportunities Ltd. (NEWFOR) a
subsidiary of Forest Renewal BC
(FRBC), a Provincial Crown
Corporation established in 1994 with
a mandate to reinvest part of the
Government’s stumpage fees in BC’s
forest base. NEWFOR was modelled
on HCL and used HCL to manage
the database and assist with labour
relations issues. In fiscal 200-01
NEWFOR spent just over $10 million
on silviculture activities.
The success of the Project
Agreement model in the
transportation sector gives rise to
the question of whether it could be
used more broadly in other capital
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projects funded by the Government.
Again, no definitive answer can be
given. But applying this model to
other areas of public construction on
a pilot basis would be a worthwhile
experiment. Moreover, as the IWA-
NEWFOR experience suggests, it
might have applications outside
construction as well.
The NDP lost the election,
disastrously, in the late spring of
2001. On taking power, the new
Liberal Government – whose
election campaign received
considerable support and policy
advice from the non-union
contractors – announced that it
would dismantle HCL once existing
contracts were fulfilled.15  Future
public construction would be based
on a return to the earlier practice of
‘open tendering’. There are also
indications that the Government is
considering ending BC Hydro’s
longstanding practice of Project
Agreements. This policy change
means the end of BC’s interesting
experiment in public construction –
at least as long as the Liberals
remain in office.
Hopefully, the promise of this
approach – and its clearly
demonstrated benefits – will be
remembered and taken up by the
labour movement in the future.
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NOTES
1. John Calvert was a  Policy Advisor in BC's
Crown Corporations Secretariat. Blair
Redlin is a former BC Government Deputy
Minister.
2. The data fluctuate significantly from year
to year for both indicators, but the long-
term trend is clear. For example, in 1983,
there were 373 successful certification
applications. In 1992, there were only 47
successful applications, according to data
compiled by David Fairey of the Trade
Union Research Bureau from BC Labour
Relations Board statistics.
3. The reality of these pressures was driven
home when the NDP attempted to make
major revisions to the Labour Code in
1998. The proposed changes, which were
initiated by (then) Premier Clark, and
designed to strengthen the building trades
ability to organize, resulted in such a
firestorm of opposition from business and
the media that the Government backed
down completely.
4. In adopting a new approach to highway
construction, significant barriers had to be
overcome. The road construction industry
in BC has traditionally drawn its
workforce from a narrow stratum of
society: white males. It has provided
relatively few employment opportunities
for women, First Nations, visible
minorities or people with disabilities. Data
on the equity composition of the industry
is very limited because neither
governments nor employers have made a
systematic effort to document the extent to
which members of designated equity
groups have been employed.
The best source of information for BC is a
January, 1990 Employment and
Immigration Canada study, entitled
Women, Native Indians, Visible Minorities
and People With Disabilities Working for
Employers. (This is the only recent BC
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study of the issue.) According to this
study, total employment of people from
the first three of these equity groups was
estimated at about four percent. However,
the break down among the three equity
groups revealed that of the 3929
individuals surveyed, only 12 were
women, 5 of whom were apprentices.
Aboriginal representation was only 41,
including 2 apprentices. These two groups
represented about 1.3 percent of the
workforce. Visible minorities accounted
for 105 workers, or about two thirds of the
equity total. While this study was
restricted to the unionised sector (and
carried out with the co-operation of the
unionised employers and organised
labour), there is no reason to assume that
equity representation was - or is now - any
higher in the unorganised parts of the
highway construction industry.
5. The first collective agreement embodying
this process was reached in December
1961. Interview with Wayne Morris,
former labour relations manager of BC
Hydro, October 2, 2002.
6. While the agreement covers all workers, a
modified RAND formula applied to
workers who chose not to join the union.
In practice, union membership was almost
universal.
7. The legitimacy of this arrangement was
challenged by non-union contractors who
went to the BC Labour Relations Board,
arguing that HCL was not the true
employer. They failed.
8. Three key occupations were the focus of
the training program: construction
laborers, operating engineers and
teamsters (truck drivers). There were also
some apprentices on the project, but the
number of workers in apprenticed trades
was much smaller and the training
timelines were considerably longer.
9. The actual budget was not determined
until after the passage of the Build BC Act.
It was formulated by the Board of the
BCTFA based on Treasury Board debt
limit allocations. The BCTFA also
determined (and modified) the scope and
schedule of the Project.
10.  Marjorie Griffin-Cohen and Kate Braid,
2000, The Road to Equity: Training Women
and First Nations on the Vancouver Island
Highway. Vancouver: The Canadian
Centre for Policy Alternatives.
11. BC Ministry of Transportation web site.
12. Statistics from the BC Ministry of
Transportation and Highways web site.
13. The unions and HCL recognized that
contractors had to be made responsible
for the safety of their operations. As a
result, for WCB purposes, contractors
were assessed by the WCB on the basis of
the normal experience rating system.
Thus they had a financial reason to
comply with the HCL safety program.
14. YMC, a First Nations owned road
construction company partnered with
P.C.L./Ledcor to build a section of road.
15. The Independent Contractors and
Businesses Association of BC (ICBA) was
the largest single financial donor to the
Liberal Party in the last Provincial
election.
